DISABLED, DEFENSELESS, AND STILL DEPORTABLE: WHY
DEPORTATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION UNDERMINES
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED IMMIGRANTS
Helen Eisner
I. INTRODUCTION
Xiu Ping Jiang, a Chinese immigrant with a history of attempted
suicide, sat through her immigration hearing silently with her “arms
1
folded, [and] her eyes downcast.” Without a court-appointed lawyer,
and without the mental wherewithal to communicate with the immigration judge, she was treated by the court as if she had failed to ap2
pear.
Jose Fernandez Sanchez, a forty-five-year-old Mexican immigrant
who suffers from schizophrenia, was so catatonic during an immigration proceeding that he was unable to answer the immigration
3
judge’s most basic questions. Nonetheless, Fernandez Sanchez was
4
expected to represent himself in his deportation hearing.
The experiences of Jiang and Fernandez Sanchez are not unique.
Their stories illustrate the obstacles facing mentally disabled immigrants when they are unable to afford an attorney. Under the Sixth
Amendment, mentally disabled criminal defendants receive vigorous
5
protections, including the right to counsel. In contrast, there is no
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Nina Bernstein, Mentally Ill and in Immigration Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at A21.
Id. at A17.
See Emily Ramshaw, Mentally Ill Immigrants Have Little Hope for Care When Detained, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 13, 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/
tools/MHI/library/Emily%20Ramshaw,%20The%20Dallas%20Morning%20News,%20Ju
ly%2013,%202009.pdf (describing the hurdles facing mentally ill immigrants, such as
Fernandez Sanchez, who are not afforded the right to counsel).
Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); see also Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108
(1954) (“We have not allowed convictions to stand if the accused stood trial without ben-
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comparable right to court-appointed counsel for noncitizens during
immigration hearings, even when an immigrant’s mental impairments render him delusional, unable to understand the consequences of his hearing, or incapable of presenting arguments in his
6
favor.
In December 2010, a federal judge in the Central District of California held that to receive a fair hearing, two immigrants with mental
7
disabilities should be provided with counsel. This decision, the first
to recognize a right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants, underscores the need for further clarity about the rights of this vulnerable population.
This Comment examines the barriers confronting mentally disabled immigrants who struggle to represent themselves in the immigration system without the right to counsel and argues that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees a right to counsel
for these detainees. While the law does not currently recognize a
right to counsel for immigrants in immigration hearings, detainees
are entitled to protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
8
Amendment. Additionally, the law recognizes that both criminal
and immigration sanctions have the potential to curtail personal li-
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efit of counsel and yet was so unskilled, so ignorant, or so mentally deficient as not to be
able to comprehend the legal issues involved in his defense.”).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: MENTAL DISABILITY, UNFAIR
HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE US IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 46, 53–56 (2010),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/usdeportation0710_0.pdf (documenting
cases where noncitizens with mental disabilities represented themselves in immigration
court).
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2010). In this class action suit, the judge held that a reasonable accommodation for detainees with mental disabilities included the appointment of counsel. Id. When asked if he understood what
was happening after waiving his right to appeal his removal, one claimant in the case,
who was diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, stated to the immigration
judge, “Yes. But I don’t understand anything now.” Id. at 1041. Although the detainees
raised due process claims, the judge did not address these claims and instead relied on
the need to comply with regulatory requirements to reasonably accommodate incompetent aliens. Id. at 1055. See First Amended Complaint at 30, Franco-Gonzalez, 767 F. Supp.
2d 1034 (No. 10-CV-02211) (arguing on behalf of the claimants that “the [U.S.] Constitution requires the Government to (1) conduct competency evaluations for all those who
the Government knows or should know may be incompetent to represent themselves,
[and] (2) appoint attorneys for those found to be in need of counsel”).
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (“But once an alien lawfully enters and
resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First
and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101
(1903) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires that aliens receive a fair hearing
before they are deported).
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9

berty and impose similar hardships on individuals. While mentally
disabled immigrants do have the right to a fair hearing, those who
find themselves responsible for their own defense may lack the capacity to recognize the significance of their proceedings. The complexities of presenting a case and asserting a claim for asylum or withholding of removal will likely be impossible for a mentally disabled
10
detainee to grasp.
Therefore, the immigration system’s current
standard of denying a right to counsel for mentally disabled detainees
jeopardizes constitutional due process and unfairly deprives those
most in need of the protections of a fair hearing.
Part II of this Comment discusses the prevalence of mental disabilities within the immigrant detainee population and explains the importance of legal representation for avoiding deportation. Part III
argues that the current system of self-representation violates the Fifth
Amendment due process rights of mentally disabled immigrants. A
necessary context for this argument is the vigorous protections that
exist in the criminal justice system to determine a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial and capacity to represent himself.
The immigration court could use the criminal justice system as a
model if it were to adopt a right to counsel. Next, Part III details the
constitutional protections currently afforded to immigrants and contends that a system of default self-representation by the mentally disabled undermines fundamental fairness. This Part further defines
what process is due by balancing the individual and governmental interests, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of rights. Part IV draws
from federal regulations, agency actions, and human rights laws to
present policy arguments that favor recognition of a right to counsel.
Part V concludes by recommending reforms to federal law and the
immigration court and detention system to protect immigrant due
process rights.

9
10

See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 147 (emphasizing that although the denial of asylum is not a criminal penalty, it still imposes a great hardship).
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL
RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE PROTECTIONS (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/09/AsylumWithholdingCATProtections.pdf (describing the process for asserting a claim for asylum and for asserting a claim for withholding
of removal).
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II. THE PREVALENCE OF MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF COUNSEL
11

Mental disabilities pervade the detainee population. These disabilities place immigrants at a distinct disadvantage when they attempt to present a case for asylum or withholding of removal, and
their prevalence highlights the need to enact safeguards that address
the current deficiencies of the immigration court system.
A. The Incidence of Mental Disability in Immigration Detention
The immigration detention network is vast. In fiscal year 2009,
U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detained be12
tween 380,000 and 442,000 immigrants. Detained immigrants include individuals who entered the United States without authorization, individuals seeking asylum, and U.S. permanent resident aliens
13
facing criminal charges. To determine whether noncitizens will be
deported or receive a grant of asylum, detainees attend hearings in
14
immigration court. The immigration court system is overseen by the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), a division of the
15
Department of Justice. Since immigration courts are notoriously
overburdened, immigration judges resolve the influx of cases by de16
ciding an average of four cases each day. In 2008, individual immi11
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For the purposes of this Comment, the phrase “mental disability” will refer to mental,
behavioral, and emotional conditions, and intellectual disabilities that undermine an individual’s ability to prepare a case and represent himself during a court proceeding. This
analysis excludes mental disabilities such as anxiety disorders that do not implicate an individual’s capacity to understand the charges against him and fairly represent himself. If
Congress adopts a right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants, regulations can provide guidance to immigration judges charged with making capacity determinations. See
infra Part II.A for a discussion of the widespread presence of mental disability in immigration detention.
TEXAS APPLESEED, JUSTICE FOR IMMIGRATION’S HIDDEN POPULATION: PROTECTING THE
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT AND
DETENTION SYSTEM 9 (2010), available at http://www.texasappleseed.net/index.php?
option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=313.
Id. at 10.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 3 (describing the crimes for which an alleged
violator, who could be mentally disabled, may be brought into immigration court).
See generally Executive Office for Immigration Review: About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/orginfo.htm (last updated Sept. 2010) (providing background information about the EOIR, its creation, and its organization).
See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 14 (noting that in fiscal year 2009, it was estimated
that each immigration judge had to decide four cases per business day); see also AM. BAR
ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE,
FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES ES19 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
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gration judges issued an average of 1014 decisions a piece. By contrast, Veterans law judges issued on average 729 decisions and Social
17
Security Administration law judges decided an average of 544 cases.
For immigration judges, the difficulties of rendering decisions are
exacerbated by the absence of administrative support staff—there is
18
on average one law clerk for every four immigration judges. Therefore, immigration judges must balance the competing pressures of
rising caseloads and limited resources.
Mental health disabilities are widespread among the detainee
population. Neither ICE nor the EOIR keeps comprehensive records
about immigrant mental health, but ICE estimates from 2008 suggest
that between 7571 and 18,929 detainees suffered from a “serious
mental illness” and that between 38,000 and 60,000 detainees had
19
some contact with the immigrant mental health system. Additionally, the international advocacy group Human Rights Watch estimates
20
that 57,000 detainees have a mental disability. The widespread use
of psychotropic medicine within ICE detention facilities further highlights the prevalence of mental disability among the detainee popula21
tion.
When immigrants are first brought into detention, ICE requires
that detainees receive an initial medical and mental health screen22
ing. However, overcrowding strains ICE staff and often impedes
23
recognition of detainees’ mental health disabilities. In one Massachusetts study, overcrowding in ICE facilities created backlogs of several weeks before medical staff addressed detainees’ health com24
plaints. While ICE has standards in place for treating immigrants,
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media/nosearch/immigration_reform_executive_summary_012510.authcheckdam.pdf
(explaining that between fiscal year 1996 and fiscal year 2008, there was a 23% increase in
the number of cases commenced in immigration court to expel noncitizens).
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 16, at ES-28.
Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 17.
Id. at 3.
See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 12 (explaining that between January 1, 2005 and
June 1, 2009, 14,859 detained immigrants received prescriptions for an average of more
than five psychotropic drugs).
See Lisa A. Cahan, Constitutional Protections of Aliens: A Call for Action to Provide Adequate
Health Care for Immigration Detainees, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 343, 350 (2007) (criticizing immigrants’ inadequate access to health care).
See id. at 348 n.21 (explaining how overcrowding at facilities undermines the timeliness
and availability of care).
See ACLU OF MASS., DETENTION IN THE AGE OF ICE: IMMIGRANTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
MASSACHUSETTS 49 (2008), available at http://www.aclum.org/ice/documents/
aclu_ice_detention_report.pdf (detailing the impact of overcrowding on immigrants who
are held in detention facilities in Massachusetts).
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these standards are not regulations and do not provide concrete re25
quirements for ICE employees. Given this backdrop, mentally disabled immigrants confront a system that is unable to recognize individual vulnerabilities and provide the support necessary to ensure fair
representation.
B. Detainee Self-Representation
In immigration court, access to counsel can be the single factor
that determines the success or failure of an asylum claim. Immigrants have the right to be represented by an attorney in immigration
26
court but do not have the right to a government-funded attorney.
Thus, mentally disabled immigrants with limited resources face a
high likelihood of deportation.
Given that most immigrants come from indigent backgrounds,
27
hiring a lawyer is often infeasible. As a result, 61% of immigrants
28
represent themselves in immigration court. This statistic includes
both detained and non-detained immigrants. For detained immigrants, the incidence of self-representation grows precipitously, as
approximately 84% of detained immigrants do not have representa29
tion during removal proceedings. In some Texas detention facili30
ties, 97% of immigrants lack representation during hearings.
Self-representation puts immigrants at a significant disadvantage.
Most detainees are unfamiliar with court procedures and do not have
training in immigration law. Asylum seekers who have legal representation are four to six times more likely to receive asylum than un-
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See Detention and Removal: Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 56–60 (2007), (statement of Tom Jawetz, ACLU Nat’l Prison Project, Presentation on Medical Care and Deaths in ICE Custody).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(b)(4)(A) (2006) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is
authorized to practice in such proceedings . . . .”).
See Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation:
Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 548 (2009) (explaining that foreign-born immigrants, who often come from underprivileged communities,
rarely have the financial means to hire counsel).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 5.
See AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 30
(2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (describing the barriers immigration detainees face in obtaining counsel).
See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 13.
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31

represented detainees. Studies suggest that individuals who proceed
pro se are simply unaware of defenses that would result in successful
32
asylum claims. Self-represented immigrants face the additional burden of having to confront experienced government attorneys on the
33
opposing side. This combination of obstacles means that individuals
who are not represented by counsel experience a heightened risk of
deportation. Beyond a lack of representation, insufficient access to
information about the charges against them and language barriers
also contribute to adverse outcomes for immigrants who proceed
34
without an attorney.
Mental disability exacerbates the burdens already facing detainees
during court proceedings. Even a mentally sound immigrant without
legal training would have trouble grasping the complexities of an asylum defense. The challenge is that much greater for a detainee with
mental disabilities who lacks the capacity to understand the charges
35
against him, let alone present a coherent case for asylum. Without
representation, these immigrants have little hope of avoiding deportation.
III. DUE PROCESS DEPRIVATIONS WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
FOR MENTALLY DISABLED IMMIGRANTS
The right to fairly present a case is a critical component of constitutional due process. Yet, mentally disabled immigrants are at a distinct disadvantage. Their disability prevents effective selfrepresentation, and thus, mandatory self-representation conflicts with
immigrants’ due process rights. This Part argues that immigrant due
process rights should include the right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants. It first describes the framework of constitutional
protections for immigrants and compares these protections with
those afforded to criminal defendants. Next, it shows how the cur31

32

33
34
35

See Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for
Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 740 (2002) (discussing asylum seekers’ lack of access to
legal representation).
See Michael J. Churgin, An Essay on Legal Representation of Non-Citizens in Detention, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 167, 171 (2010) (citing a study of New York detainees that found “that few detainees had any knowledge of possible defenses to removal,
while almost 40% had colorable claims as determined by the project attorneys”).
See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 5.
See Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 31, at 751–52 (discussing efforts to provide asylum
seekers with information in multiple languages about their rights).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 40 (describing a mentally ill man who told the
judge “just deport me” believing that deportation meant he would be able to leave detention, but not that he would be sent out of the country).
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rent system of self-representation by the mentally disabled implicates
fundamental fairness concerns and undermines immigrant due
process. This Part concludes by analyzing what process should be
due to mentally disabled immigrants.
A. Immigrant Constitutional Protections
In contrast to the criminal justice system, immigration proceed36
ings are classified as civil in nature. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the accused in criminal proceedings has the right “to have
37
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” Yet, Sixth Amendment
38
protections are often confined to the criminal justice system. Thus,
although a mentally disabled immigrant facing criminal charges
would have a right to counsel, the same immigrant facing deporta39
tion would not because of the civil nature of the proceeding.
While there is no right to counsel for immigrants in deportation
proceedings, detainees do receive substantial due process protections
40
under the Fifth Amendment. In Yamataya v. Fisher, the Court rec36
37
38

39

40

See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is a
purely civil action . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (describing the track record of uncertainty about the Sixth Amendment’s application outside of the criminal context); see also
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions).
A recent Supreme Court decision, Turner v. Rogers, introduces new due process considerations for determining the rights of civil defendants who face the possibility of incarceration. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). The defendant in Turner faced civil contempt charges for
failure to pay child support. Id. at 2513. He challenged the constitutionality of the proceeding based on his denial of the right to counsel. Id. at 2514. Applying the Mathews v.
Eldridge balancing test, the Court assessed whether denying him access to counsel was
fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2517. For a discussion of this
test, see infra Part III.E. The Turner Court recognized that the private interest at stake—
the deprivation of liberty through imprisonment—argued “strongly for the right to counsel.” Id. However, the Court found that “substitute procedural safeguards” used in civil
contempt proceedings reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation and negated the constitutional challenge. Id. at 5219. The case suggests that there is a right to counsel when a
civil defendant faces a potential deprivation of liberty, and safeguards would not remedy
fundamental fairness concerns. The Court referenced protections in civil contempt proceedings including the use of forms to identify financial information, and an opportunity
for the civil defendant to respond to statements about his financial status. Id. For a mentally disabled individual, the use of forms or the opportunity to respond to claims about
immigration status would still present accuracy problems and would not reduce the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of liberty. Thus, the holding in Turner supports the
right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of
the potential deprivation of liberty that mentally disabled immigrants confront.
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (finding that due process protections extend to immigrants).
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ognized that immigrants have protected liberty interests and that the
Due Process Clause prevents these interests from being denied arbi41
trarily. Yamataya laid the foundation for extending constitutional
protections to noncitizens. The Court explained:
[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding,
that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles
that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adop42
tion of the Constitution.

Even in the context of burgeoning immigration to the United
43
States, immigrant due process protections still remain forceful. In
Woody v. INS, the Court again asserted that to protect immigrants’
rights, there must be “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” proof be44
fore a person can be deported. Federal regulations reinforce these
legal protections and ensure that an immigrant receives “a reasonable
opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him or
her, to present evidence in his or her own behalf and to cross45
examine witnesses presented by the government.”
Both federal
courts and federal regulators have thus made clear that due process
protections mandating a fair hearing apply equally to immigrant detainees and criminal defendants.
B. Mental Health Protections in the Criminal Justice System
The absence of a right to counsel in the immigration system contrasts with the due process rights afforded mentally disabled criminal
defendants. In the criminal system, individuals with mental disabili46
ties receive robust protections. Although the criminal system and

41
42
43

44
45
46

See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (applying
the Due Process Clause to aliens present in the United States).
Id. at 100.
According to the Center for Immigration Studies, 13.1 million legal and illegal immigrants arrived in the United States in the last ten years. See Census: Population Up 27 Million in Just 10 Years, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Dec. 2010), http://cis.org/
2010CensusPopulation. Further, the Pew Research Center estimates that unauthorized
immigrants who would be subject to deportation proceedings comprise 4% of the country’s adult population. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR U.S.-BORN CHILDREN 1 (2010), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/125.pdf.
385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2006).
See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006) (prescribing the process for determining an individual’s
mental competency to stand trial). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the civil
system also includes protections for incompetent persons who are the subject of civil
suits. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
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the civil immigration system are distinct, both systems offer parallel
due process protections. The same due process arguments that support the rights of mentally disabled criminal defendants should apply
with equal force to mentally disabled detainees. Thus, a comparison
between the respective systems helps to frame the argument for
enacting a right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants.
There are two levels of protection for criminal defendants based
on (1) whether they are competent to stand trial, and (2) whether
they have the capacity to represent themselves a trial.
The first level of inquiry when a criminal defendant’s mental sta47
tus is at issue examines the defendant’s competence to stand trial.
In Pate v. Robinson, the Court explained that “[w]here the evidence
raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own motion must impanel a jury and conduct a
48
sanity hearing.” According to the Court in Drope v. Missouri, “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and
any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all rele49
vant in determining whether further inquiry is required.”
The trial court next applies the well accepted Dusky v. United States
standard for determining competence to stand trial, a standard that
asks whether the individual has “sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,”
and a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
50
against him.” Thus, central to a criminal defendant’s case is the
possession of rational understanding and the ability to engage with
51
counsel—either hired or appointed.
Since Dusky was a sparsely worded opinion providing minimal
guidance, state legislatures have added their own criteria to clarify
52
the competency evaluation. One method often used in practice involves competency checklists that help judges evaluate whether a defendant understands the legal process, consistent with the Dusky

47
48
49
50
51

52

See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (observing that it is constitutionally impermissible to try a mentally incompetent defendant).
Id. at 385.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (developing the test to determine an
individual’s competence to stand trial). This standard is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
See United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998) (including whether
a defendant is able to consult with counsel as an element of the competence determination).
See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 128 (2007)
(discussing efforts by legislators, courts, and clinicians to add content to the Dusky standard).
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53

standard. Regardless of mental health or economic status, all crimi54
nal defendants have a right to counsel. A criminal defendant who is
found competent to stand trial always has access to representation.
When a criminal defendant is found competent to stand trial, the
Constitution may nevertheless preclude self-representation to protect
procedural fairness. In Massey v. Moore, a suicidal defendant, who
had been held in a psychiatric facility, was not represented by counsel
55
during trial. The Court identified this lack of representation as procedurally unfair and created a distinction between competence to
stand trial and competence to proceed without counsel during trial.
The Court explained that “one might not be insane in the sense of
being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand
56
trial without the benefit of counsel.” The Court further emphasized:
[I]f he is insane, his need of a lawyer to tender the defense is too plain
for argument. We have not allowed convictions to stand if the accused
stood trial without the benefit of counsel and yet was so unskilled, so ignorant, or so mentally deficient as not to be able to comprehend the le57
gal issues involved in his defense.

The Court similarly emphasized the need to provide counsel for the
mentally disabled in Wade v. Mayo:
There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental
capacity, are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature. This incapacity is purely personal
and can be determined only by an examination and observation of the
individual. Where such incapacity is present, the refusal to appoint
counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend58
ment.

Thus, in criminal cases, the Court vehemently opposes selfrepresentation by the mentally disabled.
The issue of capacity for self-representation was recently ad59
dressed by the Court in Indiana v. Edwards. The Court found that
the Constitution allows states to place restrictions on an individual’s
decision to represent himself, even if he has been found competent

53
54
55
56
57
58
59

See id. at 129–30 (providing an example of a judicial checklist used to assess competency).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963) (finding a right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment in all criminal proceedings).
348 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1954).
Id. at 108.
Id.
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948).
554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008).
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60

to stand trial. Further, the Court noted that the Dusky competence
standard presumes that an incompetent individual has access to
61
counsel with whom he can consult. When a mentally disabled individual proceeds without counsel, the Edwards Court explained that
“insofar as a defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context
undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives,
62
providing a fair trial.” Thus, the assignment of counsel for an individual who lacks capacity promotes fairness and preserves the integrity of the justice system.
Separate from a competency determination, a capacity determina63
tion focuses on the threat of an “improper conviction.” An individual can only represent himself if he has the ability to waive counsel
64
“voluntarily and intelligently.” Thus, the standard for voluntary representation pro se is higher than the Dusky standard for competence
65
to stand trial. Even if an individual is competent to stand trial, safeguards may be necessary to ensure that a defendant recognizes the
significance of the proceedings and can fairly and intelligently
66
represent his interests.
In addition to fairness concerns, the Court in Indiana v. Edwards
invokes individual dignity as a reason to prevent self-representation
67
by the mentally disabled.
Accordingly, for individuals who lack
60

61

62
63
64
65

66

67

Id. (“We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who
seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”).
See id. at 165; see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and
to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”).
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176–77.
Id. at 176.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
313, 322–23 (2009) (“[T]he Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the
particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to
conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits [s]tates to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent
enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the
point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” (quoting Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177–78)).
Cf. John T. Broderick, The Choice Is Ours, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2008, at 5, 5–8 (challenging the
court system to consider whether self-representation can ever be fair and concluding that
self-representation has a disproportionate impact on the poor).
See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (“[A] right of self-representation at trial will not ‘affirm the
dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the
assistance of counsel.”).
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mental capacity, “the spectacle that could well result from . . . selfrepresentation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as en68
nobling.” Therefore, provisions preventing the mentally disabled
from representing themselves protect dignitary concerns in addition
to fair outcomes.
These rigorous competency standards and limits on selfrepresentation are absent from the immigration court system. Efforts
to safeguard mentally disabled immigrants’ rights should therefore
draw on the protections offered by this parallel system.
C. Comparing the Stakes of Criminal Prosecution and Deportation
The criminal and immigration systems are characterized as legally
distinct, yet the functional consequences of the systems are similar.
The comparative impact of deportation and criminal sanctions calls
into question the constitutionality of providing criminal defendants
and detainees different procedural protections. The Supreme Court
recognizes that “although deportation technically is not criminal punishment it may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the depriva69
tion of the right to pursue a vocation or calling.” In Ng Fung Ho v.
White, the Court explained that the law extends Fifth Amendment
protections to deportation hearings because deportation “may result . . . in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life
70
worth living.” While the immigration system is civilly and legally distinct from the criminal system, the sanctions imposed by both systems
are similarly severe.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court addressed whether an attorney is
legally required to inform a client that a guilty plea would lead to de71
portation. The Court described criminal convictions and immigration penalties as “enmeshed,” because of the impact of a criminal
72
conviction on an immigrant’s legal residence in the United States.
Although Padilla confronted the consequences of a criminal plea, the
case reinforces the Court’s views about the gravity of immigration
sanctions. Understanding the comparative weight of deportation and
criminal punishment supports applying the same safeguards used in
68
69
70
71

72

Id.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945).
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (determining that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
requires attorneys to inform their clients about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction).
See id. at 1481 (“Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is intimately related to the criminal process.”).
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the criminal system to the immigration system—including the criminal system’s recognition of the unique concerns confronting the
mentally disabled.
D. Due Process Deprivations for Mentally Disabled Immigrants
The current system of compelling the mentally disabled to
represent themselves violates the Due Process Clause by failing to
provide mentally ill detainees with access to fair procedure.
In the criminal context, Massey v. Moore raised concerns about an
individual who was “so unskilled, so ignorant, or so mentally deficient
as not to be able to comprehend the legal issues involved in his de73
fense.” The same critique applies to mentally disabled immigrants,
like Jose Fernandez Sanchez and Xiu Ping Jiang. In spite of their status as immigrants, Fernandez Sanchez and Jiang still have due
process rights and face sanctions that could deprive them of “all that
74
makes life worth living.” If either individual were brought into criminal court, it would be clear under the guidance of Wade v. Mayo that
because an “incapacity” was present, “the refusal to appoint counsel
[was] a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amend75
ment.” To respect due process protections, immigrants should have
access to a fair hearing. Requiring mentally disabled immigrants to
represent themselves undermines these constitutional protections.
While the Court is still developing a precise definition for due
process in the right to counsel context, it is clear that due process re76
quires fundamental fairness. Fundamental fairness concerns exist
when there is an absence of “one of the elements deemed essential to
77
due process.” In Torres-Chavez v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit assessed
whether a proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien
78
[was] prevented from reasonably presenting her case.” Thus, fundamental fairness concerns protect the presentation of a coherent legal defense in immigration proceedings.
An increasing number of circuit courts now acknowledge that preserving immigrant due process rights requires fair representation by
73
74
75
76

77
78

Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284.
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948).
See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (noting that due process has no
“precise definition” in a case rejecting a right to counsel in parental custody hearings,
and explaining that due process requires fundamental fairness).
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923).
Torres-Chavez v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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counsel.
In Lin v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
“[i]neffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a
denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment if the proceeding
was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from rea79
sonably presenting his case.” The court was willing to find prejudice
“when the performance of counsel was so inadequate that it may have
80
affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Similar legal logic applies when self-representation is “so inadequate” because of the individual’s mental deficiency that it prejudices the outcome of a hearing. Representation by a mentally ill detainee who lacks the capacity
to present a cogent case should be categorized as unconstitutional,
inadequate representation.
Further, in Prichard-Ciriza v. INS, the Fifth Circuit assessed whether
an immigration judge erred by not appointing counsel for a detainee
81
who did not have a mental disability. In its analysis, the court assessed whether the absence of counsel demonstrated “prejudice
82
which implicates the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.” The
court concluded that Prichard-Ciriza’s lack of counsel did not implicate fundamental fairness because he was repeatedly told of oppor83
tunities to access “free or low-cost” legal aid. Even so, the PrichardCiriza fundamental fairness framework raises the question of whether
self-representation by the mentally disabled prejudices a detainee’s
case in a way that is fundamentally unfair.
Going beyond the concerns attached to inadequate representation by an attorney, some courts have found that the absence of
counsel for an immigrant may violate the Due Process Clause. For
example, in United States v. Torres-Sanchez, the Eighth Circuit stated
that, “in some circumstances, depriving an alien of the right to coun84
sel may rise to a due process violation.” The court explained that
because the detainee was informed of his statutory right to seek
85
counsel, the hearing did not violate the Due Process Clause. However, a mentally ill individual who is informed of his right is unlikely
to have the capacity to understand the significance of the information or the importance of representation. Thus, safeguards that exist
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

377 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1024 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
978 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that fundamental fairness is a requirement in
deportation hearings).
Id. at 222 (quoting Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990)).
Id.
68 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 231.
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to protect the rights of mentally sound immigrants are insufficient to
86
For this reason, special rules are
protect the mentally disabled.
needed to support the mentally disabled and ensure they have access
to a fair hearing.
While some courts have concluded that self-representation by a
mentally sound detainee does not violate fundamental fairness prin87
ciples, the analysis must change when applied to a mentally disabled
detainee. The purpose of the fundamental fairness doctrine is to determine whether an individual has the opportunity to reasonably
present his case. Requiring a delusional or catatonic individual to
represent himself upends the fundamental fairness doctrine because
mental deficiency renders a reasonable presentation impossible.
Thus, the status quo supported by the current immigration system is
fundamentally unfair.
E. Determining What Process Is Due
Applying a due process balancing test provides further support for
protecting the rights of mentally disabled immigrants. The dominant
standard for determining what process is due was established by the
88
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. The Eldridge test balances the interest
of the individual, the risk of erroneous deprivation without proce89
dure, and the government’s interest in avoiding the procedure. The
following analysis examines each of these three considerations in
turn.
1. The Interest of the Individual
Mentally disabled immigrants have an undeniably critical interest
in fair representation. Without representation, there is a high likelihood that a disabled immigrant will not understand the charges
against him and will not have the opportunity to fairly present his
case. The immigrant has a profound interest in accessing counsel

86

87

88
89

The insufficiency of these safeguards implicates the previously discussed logic from Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011). See discussion supra note 38. If safeguards do
not remedy a fundamental fairness violation, then a civil complainant should have a right
to counsel.
See, e.g., Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990) (dismissing an alien’s challenge that the lack of appointed counsel was a valid ground for reversing a deportation
order).
424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976).
Id.
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who can present cogent legal arguments and increase the likelihood
90
of a successful asylum claim.
2. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Self-representation increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation.
As previously noted, individuals who do not have access to counsel
91
are significantly less likely to succeed in their asylum claims. The
fact that many asylum claims fail because detainees lack information
about available defenses illustrates the value of adequate representa92
tion.
Thus, adequate representation protects immigrants against
wrongful deportation. The risk of erroneous deprivation is only exacerbated by the existence of cognitive disabilities that obfuscate the
effectiveness of self-representation.
Further, appointing counsel protects American citizens from erroneous deportation. Mentally disabled American citizens often
come in contact with immigration authorities and lack the capacity to
identify themselves as citizens. For example, in one case, a severely
mentally ill woman from Indiana was nearly deported to Russia after
93
she told authorities that she was a Russian immigrant. Similarly, in
2008 Mark Lyttle was deported to Mexico after authorities denied his
94
asylum claim. Lyttle was a United States citizen who suffered from
95
bipolar disorder and developmental disorders.
These examples
demonstrate that enacting safeguards for the mentally disabled in the
immigration system would protect the needs of both citizens and
noncitizens and serve the public interest. Thus, under the Eldridge
balancing test, requiring the appointment of counsel as an element
of an immigrant’s due process rights serves the immigrant’s individual interest in promoting fair procedure and supports the public interest in preventing erroneous deportations.

90
91
92
93
94
95

See infra Part II.B for a discussion of how access to counsel improves the likelihood of presenting successful claims to avoid deportation.
See Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 31, at 740 (noting the increased likelihood of success in immigration proceedings with proper representation).
See Churgin, supra note 32, at 171 (explaining research that indicates that “few detainees
had any knowledge of possible defenses to removal”).
See Ramshaw, supra note 3, at 2.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 4 (describing instances of wrongful deportation of mentally ill United States citizens).
Id.
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3. The Government Interest
The government’s resource-based argument for not providing
counsel to mentally ill noncitizens is not sufficiently significant to
overcome the profound individual interest and the pronounced risk
of erroneous deprivation. Admittedly, requiring publicly funded lawyers for mentally disabled immigrants would create additional public
expense. There is also precedent for distributing government resources differently between immigrants and citizens. In Mathews v.
Diaz, the Court reasoned that government resources do not need to
96
be provided equally to citizens and noncitizens alike. In that case,
the Court denied eligibility for Social Security benefits to a noncitizen, explaining that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would
97
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” The Court also explained
that the fact that an act of Congress treats aliens and citizens diffe98
rently does not mean that government actions are “invidious.”
Therefore, the government can treat immigrants and citizens differently without implicating concerns about unjust discrimination.
However, even though aliens and citizens are legally distinct from
a resource-based perspective, both groups are entitled to due process
protections. An individual’s status as a citizen or noncitizen should
not degrade the strength of constitutional protections. In Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, the Court explained that even if the state
had a pecuniary interest in not extending the right to counsel to all
those whose parental rights were at issue, “it is hardly significant
99
enough to overcome private interests as important as those here.”
The Court therefore rejected the notion that the cost of implementing the right to counsel can subvert constitutional rights. Since immigrants and citizens have equal due process rights, financial concerns should not justify the decision to deny mentally disabled
immigrants a right to counsel.
Furthermore, there are resource-based reasons to support the
right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants. Unrepresented
96

97
98
99

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (finding that it was not a due process violation to create a five-year residency requirement before aliens who were permanent residents could receive Medicare benefits).
Id.
Id. at 80.
452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (asserting that the conservation of government resources is not a
sufficiently important reason to prevent the government from protecting a constitutional
right, but ultimately deciding that there is not a right to counsel in every parental status
termination proceeding).
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mentally disabled immigrants often “languish” in detention facilities
because judges will not accept pro se admissions of deportability from
100
these immigrants. In fact, many judges keep these detainees in detention for prolonged periods of time by issuing multiple conti101
nuances. These immigration judges may hope that, over time, additional evidence will arise to supplement what the mentally disabled
102
immigrant is able to communicate.
While judicial sympathy may
stall deportation or prevent self-representation for some, providing
counsel would create a more efficient process for determining eligibility for asylum instead of expending government resources during
prolonged periods of detention. This further bolsters the conclusion
that the individual interests at stake and the threat of erroneous deportations outweigh the government’s pecuniary interest. On balance, the Eldridge test supports enacting a right to counsel for immi103
grants.
IV. POLICY SUPPORT FOR ADOPTING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR THE
MENTALLY DISABLED
The policy arena provides further support for the constitutional
argument for enacting a right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants. Federal regulations, agency actions, and international human
rights law prove that there is policy-based support for granting men-

100

101
102
103

See Am. Bar Ass’n, Due Process for People with Mental Disabilities in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 33 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 882, 885 (2009) (presenting arguments
in favor of appointing counsel for mentally disabled immigrants).
Id.
Id.
One argument not included in this Part is that enacting a right to counsel for mentally
disabled immigrants promotes the value of individual freedom. The Court previously
recognized the need to appoint counsel outside of the criminal context when an individual’s freedom is at risk. In In re Gault, the Court found that in juvenile delinquency hearings, when a child faces the possibility of institutional commitment, the Due Process
Clause requires that a family that cannot afford representation be informed of its right to
counsel. 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). The Court recognized commitment as a “deprivation of
liberty. . . . whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’” Id. at 50. Thus, the Court disregarded civil and criminal labels and supported a right to counsel because of the potential
impact of the juvenile adjudication on individual freedom. Id. The seriousness of the
consequences of juvenile commitment motivated the Court in its decision. Id.
Since the Supreme Court already recognizes that deportation has significant consequences for individual freedom and because of the Court’s willingness to extend the right
to counsel outside of the criminal context when individual freedom is at stake, the Due
Process Clause should extend to protect the right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants. Without the ability to adequately present a case, current law undermines immigrants’ individual freedom and fails to provide them with recourse under the law.

530

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:2

tally disabled immigrants fair procedure instead of mandating compulsory self-representation.
A. The Immigration System Already Recognizes the Unique Needs of the
Mentally Disabled
Federal regulations provide protections for mentally incompetent
individuals who cannot appear at trial and prevent immigration
judges from accepting admissions of deportability from unrepresented respondents who are incompetent.
Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(3), “[i]f it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental
incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and
104
Thus, Congress recognizes the unique
privileges of the alien.”
needs of mentally disabled immigrants. This is not a new development, but part of a long legislative history of protecting the needs of
105
mentally challenged immigrants.
Further, under 8 C.F.R.
1240.48(b) “[t]he immigration judge shall not accept an admission of
deportability from an unrepresented respondent who is incompe106
tent.” This regulation demonstrates that the immigration system is
already set up to be responsive to the unique needs of mentally impaired immigrants. A logical extension of the policy that motivates
these protections supports enacting safeguards against compelling
mentally disabled immigrants to represent themselves in immigration
court.
B. Recent Policy Developments Support Enacting Safeguards for Mentally
Disabled Immigrants
Further, although the immigration system has traditionally rejected the right to counsel, there are signs that policymakers are beginning to recognize the importance of effective assistance. This
change may have implications for self-representation by the mentally
disabled. Attorney General Holder’s recent decision to vacate In re

104

105

106

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006); see also Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1055 (C.D. Cal 2010) (relying on § 1229a(b)(3) to conclude that reasonable accommodations for mentally disabled immigrants include the right to counsel).
See A Brief History of Those Provisions in the Act and Regulations Addressing Respondents with
Mental Health Issues, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/
tools/MHI/history.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (describing the enactment of safeguards for incompetent immigrants from 1952 until the present).
8 C.F.R. § 1240.48(b) (2004).
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Compean signals a possible sea change for immigration proceedings.
In Compean, former Attorney General Mukasey issued an order stating
that there was no right to effective assistance of counsel for immi108
grants because there was no right to counsel for immigrants.
In
addition to vacating the decision, Attorney General Holder decided
to initiate a rulemaking process to evaluate the framework for determining whether an immigrant was prejudiced by the action or inac109
tion of counsel. This demonstrates additional support for ensuring
that immigrants have effective representation. The recognition that
immigrants may have a right to effective assistance contrasts with the
incontrovertible fact that self-representation by mentally disabled
immigrants is ineffective.
Finally, the EOIR itself acknowledges that no formal guidelines
exist for recognizing mental health concerns during removal proceedings and that judges need more guidance for how to fairly treat
110
mentally disabled detainees.
ICE is currently considering the ab111
This suggests
sence of standards to assess detainee competence.
additional policy support for reforms to more effectively protect the
mental health needs of detainees.
C. Human Rights Law Support for the Right to Counsel
Policymakers look to international law as a framework for understanding international standards of procedural fairness. While international law does not impose positive obligations on the United
States, it does provide guidance for how to treat noncitizens with dig107

108

109

110

111

In re Compean, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (A.G. June 3, 2009) (dismissing Attorney General Mukasey’s earlier conclusion that, in removal proceedings, there is no constitutional guarantee
to effective assistance of counsel).
In re Compean, 24 I&N Dec. 710, 714 (A.G. Jan. 7, 2009) (concluding that an immigrant
does not have a right to challenge the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the decision to reopen a proceeding based on ineffective assistance is a matter of discretion for
the Board of Immigration Appeals).
In re Compean, 25 I&N Dec. at 2 (directing “the Acting Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review to initiate rulemaking procedures as soon as practicable to evaluate
the Lozada framework,” thereby allowing the Department of Justice to publish a final rule
with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings).
See TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 52 (noting that, in response to a letter to Attorney
General Holder in which more than seventy mental health and immigration advocacy organizations submitted recommendations for reforms to the immigration court system, the
EOIR explained that it was “presently focusing on providing training to all appropriate
EOIR legal staff on mental health issues in removal proceedings”).
See Bernstein, supra note 1, at A21 (explaining that Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano is conducting a review of immigration practices and that, according to a
spokesman, “ICE recognizes the need to address mental health issues among its detainees”).
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112

nity and procedural fairness.
International human rights law provides additional support for enacting safeguards to protect mentally
disabled immigrants. In 1977, the United States signed the American
Convention on Human Rights, which states: “Every person has the
right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time,
by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law . . . for the determination of his rights and obliga113
tions of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has interpreted the meaning of the due process protections of the American
Convention on Human Rights broadly to include the right to be
114
represented by counsel.
Additionally, in 2006 the United States
115
signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Although the Convention was never ratified, it requires that nations
116
“ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities.” This
includes “appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal ca117
pacity.”
Finally, general United Nations principles for detained
noncitizens require immigrants to have access to counsel when they
118
cannot afford representation. Thus, international human rights law
provides additional persuasive support for creating a right to counsel
for mentally disabled immigrants.

112

113
114

115
116
117
118

See United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees 1993: The
Challenge of Protection, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACH 56–57 (Karen Musalo et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011) (providing background information about the protections that international human rights law offers refugees).
American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”) art. 8, Nov. 22,
1969, T.S. No. 36, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-32.html.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 41 (discussing the Commission’s analysis that
the American Convention on Human Rights commands a sufficiently broad construal of
due process guarantees for individuals facing deportation).
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006).
Id. at art. 13.
Id. at art. 12.
See Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, U.N. Doc. A/43/173, Annex (Dec. 9, 1988) (“If a detained person does
not have a legal counsel of his own choice, he shall be entitled to have a legal counsel assigned to him by a judicial or other authority in all cases where the interests of justice so
require and without payment by him if he does not have sufficient means to pay.”).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING IMMIGRANT DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS
To ensure that the immigration system respects the constitutional
rights of mentally disabled immigrants, this Part presents numerous
recommendations to improve the experience of mentally disabled
119
immigrants during immigration proceedings.
A. Develop Reliable Screening Techniques to Recognize Mental Disabilities
Identifying mental disabilities prior to court proceedings will ensure that immigrants receive appropriate mental health care and prevent guesswork in the courtroom. Judges often lack the training necessary to identify mental disabilities. Further, an individual’s
courtroom behavior may not clearly reveal his need for mental health
precautions. This illustrates the importance of appropriate mental
health screening for all detainees. Currently, ICE does not have uniform standards, and this piecemeal approach impedes identification
120
of mental health problems. ICE should ensure that mental health
professionals perform screenings consistently and frequently. Once a
mental disability is identified, ICE officials should inform the immigration court. Consistent identification and coordination will allow
the immigration court to assess the detainee’s competency and capacity during a hearing.
Furthermore, immigration judges and the EOIR staff should be
given additional training in identifying mental disabilities. If an immigrant’s mental health is in question, the judge should make sure
that the immigrant receives appropriate mental health care instead of
continuing with the immigration proceedings.

119

120

Many of these recommendations draw on suggestions promoted by other commentators.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 83 (advising, among others, the Assistant Secretary of ICE to continue “exercising favorable prosecutorial discretion in cases where it
appears the non-citizen has a mental disability” that hinders her ability to present or prevail in court); TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 12, at 7 (suggesting the United States Department of Justice undertake procedural reforms to establish consistency in immigration
court and thereby ensure the fair treatment of mentally disabled immigrants facing deportation).
See Detention and Removal: Immigration Detainee Medical Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
supra note 25, at 5–6 (explaining the variation in standards applied by ICE staff for assessing and treating detainee mental health).
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B. Develop Clear Standards for Assessing Competency to Stand Trial and
Capacity for Self-Representation
1. Competency Standards
There are no uniform standards by which an immigration judge
can determine if a person is competent to stand trial or has the capacity to represent himself. This is true even though an immigration
judge cannot accept an admission of deportability from an incompe121
tent individual.
Using the criminal Dusky standard as a guide, the
EOIR should adopt new regulations to clarify the test for competence
in immigration court. Guidance will ensure that immigration judges
apply standards consistently, instead of speculating about how best to
evaluate competency. One option, similar to the approach adopted
by many state legislatures in the criminal law context, is to give immigration judges formal checklists and other clear standards to apply.
2. Capacity Evaluation
Once an individual’s capacity to represent himself is at issue, a capacity hearing should be held to determine whether he has the ability
to represent himself. The criminal standard could be applied
through regulations that analyze whether the individual decides to
122
represent himself “voluntarily and intelligently.”
Additionally, the
court should assess whether, considering the individual’s mental abilities, allowing self-representation would increase the chance of a
123
wrongful conviction. This assessment could be conducted through
specialized mental health dockets with training for judges in recognizing psychological and developmental disabilities. Given that a
large proportion of detainees suffer from mental disabilities, an efficient system for recognizing capacity issues will facilitate the EOIR’s
work.

121
122
123

8 C.F.R. § 1240.48(b) (2006) (“The immigration judge shall not accept an admission of
deportability from an unrepresented respondent who is incompetent.”).
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (holding that a state criminal defendant
may waive his right to counsel if he does so voluntarily and intelligently).
See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (describing the risk that selfrepresentation by an individual with a mental disability will result in an improper sentence).
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C. Appoint Counsel for Immigrants with Mental Disabilities
Congress should amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to
require the appointment of counsel for mentally disabled immigrants
who do not have the capacity to represent themselves. Congress
should also appropriate the necessary funds to support this provi124
sion.
After a capacity hearing, immigration judges should have the authority to appoint counsel. To clarify the procedure for appointing
counsel, the EOIR can develop regulations to guide immigration
courts.
To ensure the availability of appointed counsel, the EOIR should
coordinate closely with the American Bar Association and other
community organizations. The purpose of this coordination is to develop relationships with immigration lawyers who will be responsible
125
for representing mentally disabled detainees.
Establishing a right
to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants will advance the goals of
fairness, protect American citizens, and uphold the basic tenets of
constitutional due process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The December 2010 district court decision recognizing that two
mentally disabled immigrants had a right to counsel was the first of its
126
kind. And while this view may still be far from the mainstream, legal and policy support for creating a right to counsel for mentally
disabled detainees continues to grow. Under the Due Process Clause,
immigrants like Xiu Ping Jiang and Jose Fernandez Sanchez are

124

125

126

The Court has been unwilling to create a civil right to counsel. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28, 31–32 (1981) (holding that there is no categorical right to
counsel in parental termination hearings, but noting that cost considerations should not
motivate the decision whether to fund representation when it is constitutionally required). However, Congress should recognize that immigrants receive due process protections; the consequences of immigration can be tantamount to a criminal conviction;
the mentally vulnerable need unique protections; and the current system jeopardizes the
rights of American citizens. See discussion supra Parts III–IV.
Ninety-three community leaders signed a letter to Attorney General Holder supporting
the creation of safeguards for mentally disabled detainees, including new regulations that
require the appointment of counsel for individuals with mental disabilities facing removal
proceedings. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 100, at 882, 897–900.
See Immigrants Win Right to Representation, ACLU OF SAN DIEGO & IMPERIAL COUNTIES,
http://www.aclusandiego.org/news_item.php?article_id=001096 (last visited Oct. 28,
2011) (detailing Judge Gee’s decision to require “the government to provide representation for any individual in immigration proceedings”).
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127

guaranteed the right to a fair trial.
In the criminal system, the
Court supports appointing counsel for criminal defendants who lack
the capacity to represent themselves, and the Court has consistently
expressed its view that criminal penalties and deportation impose si128
milarly severe sanctions.
Thus, equivalent due process safeguards
should apply to mentally disabled criminal defendants and mentally
disabled immigrants. Congress and the immigration court system al129
ready recognize the unique needs of mentally ill immigrants, and
recognizing the need for court-appointed representation is just
another logical step to protect this vulnerable population.
Further, efficiency arguments support appointing counsel to save
the government the expense of prolonged detention. There is also a
strong governmental interest in preventing the erroneous deporta130
tion of American citizens. Ultimately, it is fundamentally unfair to
require immigrants who are so catatonic that they cannot fairly
present their case to be responsible for their own defense when what
131
is at stake is “all that makes life worth living.”
The country remains polarized about immigration reform, but the
right to counsel for mentally disabled immigrants would not be a
guarantee of asylum. In fact, imposing the right to counsel protects
rather than expands existing constitutional safeguards because it is
already settled law that immigrants should receive basic due process
rights. Forcing the mentally disabled to represent themselves renders
these constitutional protections meaningless, and action should be
taken to ensure that the mentally disabled do not face deportation
without representation.
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See Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (holding
that, before deportation, aliens are entitled to receive a fair hearing as required by the
Due Process Clause).
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) (suggesting that deportation, though not
criminal punishment, “may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the
right to pursue a vocation or a calling”).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(3) (2006) (“If it is impracticable by reason of an alien’s mental
incompetency for the alien to be present at the proceeding, the Attorney General shall
prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and privileges of the alien.”); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.48(b) (2006) (directing an immigration judge to direct a hearing on deportability
issues when an unrepresented respondent is not competent to offer an admission of deportability).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 4 (explaining that mentally disabled American citizens have been mistakenly deported because they could not accurately represent
their citizenship status).
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).

